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In this article I describe a framework for unifying spoken language, signed language, and 
gesture. Called the language as motion framework, it relies on three broad theories: cognitive 
grammar, dynamic systems, and cognitive neuroscience. The foundational claim of the 
language in motion framework is that language and gesture are manifestations of a general 
human expressive ability which is grounded in embodied cognition and the need for mobile 
creatures to make sense of their environment. 
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En este artículo se describe un marco teórico para la unificación de la lengua oral, la lengua de 
signos y el gesto. Se denomina el lenguaje como movimiento y parte de tres teorías principales: 
la gramática cognitiva, la teoría de sistemas dinámicos y la neurociencia cognitiva. La 
afirmación fundamental del marco teórico del lenguaje en movimiento es que el lenguaje y el 
gesto son manifestaciones de una capacidad humana general para la expresión que está basada 
en la cognición corpórea y la necesidad de las criaturas móviles de dar sentido a su entorno. 




In this article I offer a framework for the unification of spoken language, signed 
language, and gesture. I start with the observation that in order to 
communicate, animals must create perceptible signals. For human 
communication, the predominant way in which signals are produced is by 
moving parts of our bodies. For speech, the means of production is restricted to 
the vocal tract. For signed languages and gestural communication, much more 
of the body is used, including the hands, face, and body postures. As Neisser 
observed: 
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To speak is to make finely controlled movements in certain parts of your body, with the 
result that information about these movements is broadcast to the environment. For this 
reason the movements of speech are sometimes called articulatory gestures. A person 
who perceives speech, then, is picking up information about a certain class of real, 
physical, tangible (as we shall see) events that are occurring in someone’s mouth (Neisser 
1967: 156). 
My claim is that language –all language, including spoken languages such 
as English, Navajo, or Portuguese and signed languages such as American Sign 
Language, Catalan Sign Language, or Saudi Sign Language– is the production, 
perception, and interpretation of biological movement. It is articulatory 
gesturing.  
I call this the language as motion framework. Language as motion 
captures the fact that the physical foundation of language is movement. It also 
proposes that the key to unifying spoken and signed language, and gesture as 
well, is to begin with the real, physical, tangible events that constitute all 
language and gesture. 
The language as motion framework is built on three theoretical pillars: 
 
a) A theory of language that can encompass spoken and signed languages. 
The theory should not rely on an abstractionist solution, one which 
posits an abstract set of logical symbols devoid of material substance. 
Instead, I insist that the proper approach is an embodied solution which 
unifies at the level of the physical performance of language, of usage 
events. The theory I use is cognitive grammar (Langacker 1987, 1991, 
2008). 
b) A theory that models physical performance as skilled action, and which 
can be applied to a view of language as gestural performance and 
grammar as skill. For this I rely on dynamic systems theory (Thelen and 
Smith 1994; Spivey 2007). 
c) To account for how language and gesture are implemented in the brain 
as skilled action, a non-Cartesian, embodied theory of cognitive 
neuroscience is required. Such a theory is that developed by Gerald 
Edelman (1987, 1989), the Theory of Neuronal Group Selection or 
“Neural Darwinism.” Compatible theories also include those offered by 
Berthoz (2000), Llinás (2001), and Damasio (Aziz-Zadeh and Damasio 
2008; Damasio 1994, 2010). 
2. THE HUMAN EXPRESSIVE ABILITY 
I reject the notion that human language arose suddenly, or that it was 
“effectively instantaneous, in a single individual, who was instantly endowed 
with intellectual capacities far superior to those of others” (Chomsky 2005: 12). 
Rather, I claim that human language is grounded in a human expressive ability. 
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The human expressive ability is not unique to language. It is manifest in all 
forms of human expression, including dance, music, art, and gesture. 
Further, I claim that this expressive ability has its ancestral source in a 
general comprehension ability, originating from the organism’s need to make 
sense of its environment in order to survive, an ability that arose through 
natural selection. This comprehension ability to make sense is driven by the fact 
that we are mobile creatures. As the neuroscientist Rudolfo Llinás (2001: 38) 
notes, “at the behavioral level any actively moving creature must have 
predictive abilities in order to interact with the external world in a meaningful 
way.” I also claim that comprehension is selectionist rather than instructionist 
in its nature. That is, “there is no ‘voice in the burning bush’ telling the animal 
what the world description should be” (Edelman 1987: 32). 
The emergence of the ability of moving creatures to make sense of the 
world was a major, perhaps the primary, factor in the development of the 
human brain. Again, Llinás (2001: 21) sums up this position when he observes 
that “the capacity to predict the outcome of future events –critical to successful 
movement– is, most likely, the ultimate and most common of all global brain 
functions.” Because of this, the human conceptual system is deeply embodied in 
perceptual and motoric interactions with the environment. Embodied cognition 
is the motive force driving the human expressive ability. 
2.1. Embodied Cognition 
Conceptualization and the human expressive ability emerged from the need for 
sentient and mobile creatures, possessed with brains that evolved with deep 
connections between motion and perception, to create meanings. This is yet 
another implication of the embodied solution: all meaning is embodied. This 
embodied view unites a fundamental dichotomy that has been deeply 
embedded in Western thought for centuries –the mind/body duality. The 
mind/body duality encompasses a host of other dichotomies– cognition/ 
emotion, knowledge/imagination, thought/feeling, language/gesture, 
language/sign. The language as motion framework and the embodied solution 
resolves these dichotomies. As Mark Johnson (2008: 9) notes, an embodied 
approach suggests that “meaning is shaped by the nature of our bodies, 
especially our sensorimotor capacities and our ability to experience feelings and 
emotion.” The embodied theory of meaning “sees meaning and all our higher 
functioning as growing out of and shaped by our abilities to perceive things, 
manipulate objects, move our bodies in space, and evaluate our situation” 
(Johnson 2008: 11). 
2.2.  Cognitive Grammar 
Because language is conceived here as the production and perception of 
movement, language is intimately tied to the physical reality of our bodies and 
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our perceptual systems. Our body and its movements are not just the means by 
which language is performed, they are also the evolutionary precursors of 
cognition and language. 
If the language in motion framework is to be sufficiently developed to 
account for a unified view of spoken and signed languages, we need a theory of 
language that embraces the embodied solution. Such an approach, and the one 
used here, is cognitive grammar. Cognitive grammar adopts a number of 
fundamental claims about language that are compatible with the language as 
motion framework. Cognitive grammar presents an explicitly non-abstractionist 
view of grammar, offering instead a model based on embodied cognition: “The 
picture that emerges belies the prevailing view of grammar as an autonomous 
formal system. Not only is it meaningful, it also reflects our basic experience as 
moving, perceiving, and acting on the world” (Langacker 2008: 4). 
The most fundamental claim of cognitive grammar is that grammar is 
symbolic. It is important to recognize what is meant by the term symbolic. 
Within cognitive grammar, a symbol is simply the pairing between a semantic 
structure and a phonological structure, a meaning and a form (Langacker 2008: 
5). Meanings are conceptualizations recruited for linguistic expression. Form, in 
the cognitive grammar perspective, is the full expressive detail of a usage event, 
including all the phonetic details, intonation, body language, gesture, 
“conceivably even pheromones” (Langacker 2008: 457). This symbolic view of 
language includes words and signs, but it also extends to grammar and 
includes morphology, grammatical markers, grammatical classes, and syntax. 
Although developed as a theory of language, cognitive grammar posits 
only general cognitive, perceptual, and motoric abilities. In adopting cognitive 
grammar as one of the foundations of the language as motion framework, I 
suggest that all of the theoretical and analytic framework of cognitive grammar 
can be recruited to study gesture. Doing so will provide a unified 
understanding of language and gesture as manifestations of the human 
expressive ability. 
According to cognitive grammar, one of the functions of grammar is that 
to impose a particular construal onto conceptual content. This ability to 
construe situations in myriad ways is based on imaginative and creative 
abilities. Cognitive grammar eschews purely propositional or truth-conditional 
accounts of meaning, and instead favors imagistic accounts. One type of such 
conceptual structure is a set of image schemas, “schematized patterns of activity 
abstracted from everyday bodily experiences, especially pertaining to vision, 
space, motion, and force” (Langacker 2008: 32). 
In cognitive grammar, meaning is associated with conceptualization. 
Cognitive grammar uses the term ‘conceptualization’ to highlight its dynamic 
nature, “dynamic in the sense that it unfolds through processing time” 
(Langacker 2008: 32). Conceptualization is embodied in a biologically-
implemented brain, and “as neurological activity, conceptualization has a 
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temporal dimension” (Langacker 2008: 31). The same is true for the 
phonological pole of linguistic symbols. Cognitive grammar does not adopt an 
abstractionist notion of phonological structure; instead, the phonological pole 
captures all of the physical, dynamic aspects of articulatory movements. Thus, 
the cognitive grammar perspective on meaning as dynamic conceptualization 
and on phonology as observable phenomena is entirely compatible with 
dynamic systems theory and the language as motion framework. 
3. DYNAMIC SYSTEMS THEORY AND LANGUAGE 
Under the language in motion framework, the basic units of speech, sign, and 
gesture are articulatory gestures which are defined as functional units, an 
equivalence class of coordinated movements that achieve some end (Studdert-
Kennedy 1987: 77). These functionally-defined ends, or tasks, are modeled in 
terms of task dynamics (Hawkins 1992). In modeling speech, the task may be 
the formation of a constriction such as bilabial closure; this task involves the 
coordinated action of several articulators, such as the lower lip, upper lip, and 
jaw. 
Articulatory phonology has significance for language and gesture that 
goes far beyond describing speech tasks. Other articulators may be modeled in 
this way as well. For example, the arm and hand can be used to reach for a cup, 
scratch your head, or to produce a sign or gesture. Whether for speech, sign, 
gesture, or motor activities unrelated to communication, tasks require the 
coordinated action of multiple articulators moving appropriately in time and 
space. These coordinated actions, called coordinative structures, are not 
hardwired; rather, they are emergent structures in a dynamically changing 
system. 
Another significant aspect of articulatory phonology is that it unifies 
description over levels that in other theories are seen as distinct. For example, 
formalist theories such as Chomsky’s minimalist program assume that 
universal grammar “specifies certain linguistic levels, each a symbolic system” 
(1995: 167). One such level is a computational system that generates structural 
descriptions; these structural descriptions are in turn seen as instructions that 
are fed into another level, the articulatory-perceptual performance system, 
which specifies how the expression is to be articulated. 
Rather than viewing the units of language, whether they are sequences of 
static, timeless, and non-physical (i.e., mental) units such as phonemes, 
syllables, morphemes, or words, or non-physical structural descriptions which 
must be implemented in a performance system, the dynamic view defines 
language “in a unitary way across both abstract ‘planning’ and concrete 
articulatory ‘production’ levels” (Kelso et al. 1986: 31). Thus, the distinction 
between competence and performance, which plays such a large theoretical role 
in generative linguistics, is collapsed into a single system described not in the 
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machine vocabulary of mental programs and computational systems, but in 
terms of a “fluid, organic system with certain thermodynamic properties” 
(Thelen and Smith 1994: xix). As Thelen and Smith go on to observe, the 
distinction between competence and performance does not make biological 
sense: 
Abstract formal constraints are fine for disembodied logical systems. But people are 
biological entities; they are embedded, living process. If competence in the Chomskyan 
sense is part of our biology, then it must also be embodied in living, real-time process 
(Thelen and Smith 1994: 27).  
The language as motion framework provides the theoretical basis for 
describing language as a dynamic, real-time process. From the language as 
motion perspective, language is performance. 
There is one more implication of the dynamic systems approach to 
language and gesture. Although speech scientists who work within this theory 
typically restrict their study to the level of words, describing words as 
“coordinated patterns of gestures” (Studdert-Kennedy 1987: 78), the theory can 
be extended beyond words. If words are patterns of gestures, so too are larger, 
multiword expressions. This observation is especially significant when it is 
matched with the cognitive grammar claim that all levels of language, from the 
lexicon to syntax, are symbolic, the pairing of semantic and phonological 
structures. Grammar, in this view, is schematic patterns of symbolic structures 
that have both semantic and phonological import. The key point is that 
grammar always has phonological structure, even if that structure is highly 
schematic. So, we may now extend the claim of articulatory phonology even 
further, and say that if words are coordinated patterns of skilled action, and if 
multiword expressions are yet larger such structures, then grammar itself is 
coordinated patterns of cognition and action. From the language as motion 
perspective, grammar is skill. 
4. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 
The language as motion framework also has profound implications for 
cognitive neuroscience. While the abstractionist solution trivializes the role of 
embodied production and perception in language and grammar, the language 
as motion framework, by grounding language and gesture in physical systems, 
claims that cognition and perception must be intimately linked. In this view, 
“what we perceive is determined by what we do,” and perception is seen as a 
type of skillful bodily activity (Noë 2004: 1). The same dynamic models that 
account for the emergence of coordinative structures in skilled movement, such 
as fluent fingerspelling, speech, sign, or gesture, are recruited to explain 
cognition. Under this framework, then, “cognition –mental life– and action  –the 
life of the limbs– are like the emergent structure of other natural phenomena” 
(Thelen and Smith 1994: xix). 
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This view is consistent with several current theories of brain phylogenetic 
and ontogenetic development and function. Berthoz (2000: 9), for example, 
observes that “perception is more than just the interpretation of sensory 
messages. Perception is constrained by action; it is an internal simulation of 
action.” In his view, the highest cognitive functions are the evolutionary result 
of the brain’s ability to skillfully plan movements to meet the needs of future 
events. 
The theory of neuronal group selection or “Neural Darwinism” developed 
by Gerald Edelman is also consistent with the language as motion framework, 
including the principles of cognitive grammar and dynamic systems. Three 
brief examples will serve to demonstrate how Edelman’s theory can be linked 
to cognitive grammar and to articulatory phonology. 
A key concept of neuronal group selection is reentry, “a process of 
temporally ongoing parallel signaling between separate maps along ordered 
anatomical connections” (1987: 49). For example, when we eat an apple, our 
experience maps across several perceptual modalities –the smell, taste, feel, 
color, and sound of an apple being bitten into– and motor activities –looking at, 
picking up and holding the apple, bringing the apple to our mouth, opening 
our mouth and biting, and so forth. Reentry corresponds to the cognitive 
grammar view of knowledge as encyclopedic, consisting of networks of 
concepts with no sharp boundaries between semantic and pragmatic, 
combining experience from multiple sensory modalities and our physical 
interaction with the world. 
Another key concept in neuronal group selection is degeneracy. 
“Degeneracy is the ability of elements that are structurally different to perform 
the same function or yield the same output” (Edelman and Gally 2001: 13763). 
Degeneracy is present in many levels of language, including metaphor and 
polysemy; the use of different lexical/morphological/syntactic structures to 
accomplish the same function (e.g., verb aspect); and the aforementioned 
function of grammar to impose different construals on the same conceptual 
content. In all of these cases, we find that different structures accomplish the 
same function, what in speech act theory would be called the perlocutionary 
effect. 
Edelman’s theory is also compatible with the dynamic system approach to 
articulatory phonology. Edelman (1987: 227) defines gesture as a “degenerate 
set of all those coordinated motions that can produce a particular pattern that is 
adaptive in a phenotype.” This view of gesture plays a significant role in 
Edelman’s theory in two ways. First, it ties motor activity to perception through 
reentry. Second, Edelman (1989) claims that the brain bases of gestural ordering 
played a significant role in the evolutionary emergence of language. 
The coordination and planning of movement also plays a key role in the 
theory of the evolution of the brain and language advanced by Rudolfo Llinás. 
According to Llinás (2001: 17), “the evolutionary development of a nervous 
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system is an exclusive property of actively moving creatures.” The significance 
is twofold. First, Llinás links the control of movement to the development of 
higher cognitive functioning and the mind: “that which we call thinking is the 
evolutionary internalization of movement” (Llinás 2001: 35). Second, in a 
proposal that is entirely compatible with language as motion, Llinás also ties 
the significance of movement to the emergence of language. Llinás (2001: 228) 
claims that the coordinated movements, or gestures, required for speaking are 
no different than other motor actions, noting that “the premotor events leading 
to expression of language are in every way the same as those premotor events 
that precede any movement that is executed for a purpose.” 
5. SETTING LANGUAGE IN MOTION 
I have introduced the language as motion framework as a way to unify spoken 
and signed languages. But the framework does more than that. Language as 
motion also captures the fact that our perceptual and conceptual capabilities 
have been shaped by our evolution as moving creatures solving ever more 
complex problems of emulating and predicting the natural and social 
environment. Our brains evolved to make sense of the world. Cognition is 
grounded in perception and motion, and as a result, our conceptual abilities are 
deeply embodied. These embodied conceptual abilities, which developed from 
our need to make sense of the world in which we move about, form the basis of 
the human expressive abilities in all its manifestations, from music, art, and 
dance to signed language, spoken language, and gesture. 
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